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WHEN THE LEGISLATURE ROBS PETER TO PAY PAUL:
PRETEXTUAL TAKINGS AND GOLDSTEIN V. PATAKI
Michael V. Bernier*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The power of eminent domain conferred upon municipalities and government entities has created a long line of controversial issues. Particularly, the requirement for proposed takings to further a "public use"

continuously provides courts with questions of great importance. The supreme deference historically afforded to the legislature in determining the
satisfaction of the "public use requirement" has consistently left property
owners feeling helpless and without confidence in the judicial system. In
Goldstein v. Pataki,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit analyzed such an instance, focusing not only on whether a proposed
taking satisfied the "public use requirement," but also whether the asserted
public justifications were pretextual.2 A three-judge panel of the Second
Circuit held that a taking's proposed public use satisfied the "public use
requirement" and that an asserted pretextual challenge was meritless. 3
While the Goldstein court appropriately recognized the availability of the
pretextual challenge, it failed to set forth a workable standard for its application. In this Note, I analyze the derivation of the pretextual challenge, as
well as the standards applied by Goldstein and other courts. I then propose
a burden-shifting analysis based on a set of threshold factors for application
in pretextual taking claims.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

"The Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project (the 'Atlantic

Yards Project' or the 'Project') is a publicly subsidized development project
set to cover twenty-two acres in . . . an area in the heart of downtown

Brooklyn, New York." 4 The plan for the Project included construction of a
sports arena to be home to the New Jersey Nets, approximately sixteen

high-rise apartment towers, and numerous office towers.5 The Project was
to be carried out, in part, through the assistance of the New York State
Urban Development Corporation, d/b/a the Empire State Development
* The author acknowledges the indispensable guidance of Professor Donald Campbell
throughout the drafting of this Note. His insightful direction during the preparation, development, and
writing was essential to the end product. The author also thanks his wife, Jeanne, for her tireless
support and encouragement throughout this and all other endeavors.
1. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id at 57-65.
4. Id. at 53.

5. Id. The New Jersey Nets is a team in the National Basketball Association.
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Corporation (the "ESDC"), a public-benefit corporation and political subdivision of New York State. 6 The Project involved two main parcels of
land: (1) the Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area ("Renewal Area"), a
heavily blighted area owned in part by the Metropolitan Transit Authority
("MTA"); and (2) an adjacent area with less blight (referred to in the complaint as the "Takings Area") that was held by private parties.' According
to the plan for the Project, the ESDC intended to acquire the privately held
land in the Takings Area through the use of eminent domain if necessary.8
The ESDC issued a Notice of Public Hearing and held the hearing on
August 23, 2006, as well as a community forum to discuss the Project on
September 12, 2006.9 The ESDC identified the following as the public purposes to be served by the Project:
(1) The elimination of blight in both the Takings and Non-Takings
Areas, which is the purported "principal" public purpose of the
Project;
(2) An arena to be used by a major-league sports franchise, for athletic contests featuring local academic institutions, and for other
entertainment and civic events;
(3) Approximately 2,250 units of "affordable" rental housing and between 3,075 and 4,180 units of "market rate" housing;
(4) Between 336,000 and 1,606,000 square feet of office space;
(5) "Possibly" a hotel;
(6) Eight acres of publicly accessible space;
(7) Ground-level retail space "to activate the street frontages";
(8) "Community facility spaces," including those offering child care
and "youth and senior center service";
6. Id. Various sections of New York's Eminent Domain Procedure Law were at play here. New
York law requires a condemner to conduct a pre-acquisition public hearing "in order to inform the
public [of the proposed public project] and to review the public use to be served by a proposed public
project." Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254,257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting EM. Dom. PROC. § 201
(McKinney 2006)). "At the [s]ection 201 hearing, the condemnor must announce the purpose and
location of the proposed project, and those in attendance must be given an opportunity to present oral
or written statements and to submit other documents concerning the project." Id. (quoting EM. Dom.
PROC. § 203). "A 'condemnor' is 'any entity vested with the power of eminent domain.' " Id. n.1
(quoting EM. Dom. PROC. § 103(D)). "When .. . the condemnor is an entity other than the State of
New York, the condemnor must file a petition in New York State Supreme Court in order to acquire
the condemned property." Id. at 259 (citing EM. Dom. PROC. §§ 402(B), 501). "Should the court find
that the procedural requirements of New York's Eminent Domain Procedural law have been met, it
must enter an order granting the petition." Id. (citing EM. Dom. PROC. § 402(B)(4)). "Within ninety
days of a public hearing, a condemnor must publish a synopsis of its determination and findings" specifying "(1) the public use, benefit, or purpose to be served by the proposed public project; (2) the
location of the project and the reason(s) that location was selected; (3) the general effect of the project
on the environment and residents of the locality; and (4) other factors the condemnor considers relevant." Id. at 258 (citing EM. Dom. PROC. § 204(A)-(B)). "An aggrieved person may seek judicial review of the condemnor's determination and findings within thirty days of their publication." Id (citing
EM. DoM. PRoc. § 207(A)).

7. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 53.
8. Id.
9. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 257.

2011]

WHEN THE LEGISLATURE ROBS PETER TO PAY PAUL

89

(9) A facility for the Long Island Railroad to store, clean, and inspect its trains;
(10) An additional entrance to an already existing subway station;
(11) "[S]ustainability and green design"; and
(12) "[E]nvironmental remediation of the Project Site." 10
The plaintiffs-appellants ("Appellants") were fifteen property owners
with homes and/or businesses in the Takings Area that were slated for condemnation pursuant to the eminent domain proceedings proposed by the
Project.' In October 2006, Appellants filed this suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.12 The complaint asserted, inter alia, that the use of eminent domain in furtherance of the Project would violate the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." In short, Appellants argued that the public
uses advanced for the Project were pretexts for a private taking that violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 4 Appellants contended
that the Project was not driven by legitimate concern for the public benefit
and a "substantial motivation" of the governing officials with approval authority for the Project was to benefit Bruce Ratner, a man whose company
first proposed the Project, served as the Project's primary developer, and
was the principal owner of the New Jersey Nets.' 5
The district court dismissed the federal claims, concluding that Appellants failed to state an actionable claim.16 The primary issue raised on appeal was whether the district court overlooked substantial allegations that
10. Id. at 258 (citing Determinations and Findings; internal citations omitted).
11. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 53.
12. Id. The action named as defendants Bruce Ratner, the private developer carrying out the
Project; several entities affiliated with him (collectively, the "Ratner Group"); and various officials,
agencies, and subdivisions of New York State and New York City (respectively, the "State Appellees"
and City Appellees"). Id. at 53-54. In addition, the action was filed pursuant to EM. Dom. PROC.
§ 207(A).
13. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 54 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). The complaint asserted three federal-law claims: that the use of eminent domain in furtherance of the Project would violate both the
"Public Use" Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a cause of action under New York state law against the ESDC.
14. Id.
15. Id. Appellants specifically alleged in support of the claim that the "public does not benefit
from the taking of plaintiffs' properties" and "[a]lternatively. . . any benefit from the taking of plaintiffs' properties . . . is secondary and incidental to the benefit that inures to [the Ratner Group]" because the "desire to confer a private benefit to [the Ratner Group] was a substantial, motivating factor,
in defendants' decision to seize plaintiffs' property and transfer it to [the Ratner Group]." Id. n.3. A
second cause of action asserted the claim that Appellees violated the Equal Protection Clause by
"[ellevating the status of one citizen or group of citizens" and by "singling out plaintiffs, for unequal,
adverse [ ] treatment" without a rational basis." Id. (alteration in original). A third cause of action
asserted that "in circumventing the local review process (and instead working at the state level with the
ESDC), [Appellees] violated [Appellants'] procedural due process rights." Id. A fourth cause of action
alleged various violations of New York's Eminent Domain Procedural Law section 207. Id.
16. Id. at 55. The district court concluded that the Project "would serve several public uses such
as the redress of blight, the construction of a sporting arena, and the creation of new housing." Id. As
to the equal protection claim, the district court deemed it not viable because, among other things, there
was no rational basis for any distinction between the plaintiffs and other persons. Id. (citation omitted).
As to the due process claim, the district court held that the eminent domain process was insufficient to
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Mr. Ratner was the sole beneficiary of the Project and the public uses advanced by New York Governor George E. Pataki, New York State Urban
Development Corporation, Mr. Ratner, and others ("Appellees") were a
mere pretext.' 7 Appellants argued that the sole purpose was to take land
from the plaintiffs to give to Mr. Ratner so Mr. Ratner could then develop
the property for his personal benefit.' 8
A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
land owners' Public Use Clause claim, holding that the Project was rationally related to public use and the mere fact that a private party stood to
benefit from the proposed taking did not suggest that the public use was
invalid." The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that a " 'pretext' argument provided a valid basis for a public[ ]use challenge under the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London."2 0 However,
after discussing its decision not to apply a different standard for pretext
claims, the majority found no plausible accusations of favoritism. 2 1
III.

BACKGROUND AND

HISTORY OF THE LAW

The power of eminent domain finds its origins in the Fifth Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 22 The Fifth Amendment
does provide limits to this power; one such limit is known as the "public use
requirement." 2 3 The boundaries of the public use requirement have
evolved a great deal since its inception, as will be described below.
One constant source of controversy for the public use requirement has
been the supreme deference afforded to the legislature and the corresponding narrow role of the judiciary. The pretextual takings issue raises certain
questions regarding the propriety of the deference to the legislature and
whether the judicial role should be expanded to protect against pretextual
public justifications. Accordingly, the background of the balance between
the legislature and judiciary in takings is worth a close look.
satisfy the requirements of due process. Id. (citing Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2005)). The district court "declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim"; this
issue was not challenged on appeal. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. In Appellants' brief, they claimed that " 'favored' developer [Ratner] [was] driving and
dictating the process, with government officials at all levels obediently falling into line . . . . That
abdication has allowed Ratner to co-opt the power of eminent domain; and to wield it in service of his
understandable desire to expand the Project to truly mammoth proportions, thus increasing the profit
to himself, his companies[,J and his shareholders." Id. (internal citation omitted).
19. Id. at 57-65. The court also held that a state agency could make public use determination in
exercise of power of eminent domain. Id.
20. Id. at 55 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
21. Id.; see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
23. The public use requirement was made applicable to the states through the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1998).
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Berman v. Parker: Eminent Domain as a Means to an End

In 1945, Congress enacted the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945 (the "Act") 2 4 to address redevelopment of blighted areas
throughout Washington, D.C. 25 The Act created a five-member agency
(the "Agency") 26 and gave it eminent domain authority to acquire "real
property for 'the redevelopment of blighted territory ..... ' "27 In addition

to granting the Agency certain authority, the Act also directed the National
Capital Planning Commission (the "Planning Commission") to make and
develop a land-use plan for specific project areas. 2 8 After prospective acquisition of these "blighted areas," the Act granted the Agency authority to
transfer the land to public entities, as well as to private entities. 29
The first project undertaken by the Agency under the Act pertained to
"Project Area B" in Southwest Washington, D.C. 3 0 The Planning Commission prepared a comprehensive redevelopment plan, and the District's Director of Health deemed it "necessary to redevelop Area B in the interests
of public health." 3 1 Subsequently, the Agency undertook the steps for redevelopment, and landowners owning land within the project area commenced suit, claiming that their property could not be taken
constitutionally. 3 2
The plaintiffs in the Berman underlying action owned property in the
project area on which a department store was located. 33 They claimed their
property was included in the project "under the management of a private,
not a public, agency and redeveloped for private, not public, use." 34 The
plaintiffs further claimed the project constituted an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment, specifically asserting that the taking was contrary to the public use mandate therein.35
24. Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790 (1945).
25. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
26. The Agency was named the District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency. Id. at 29.
27. Id. (quoting the Act, 60 Stat. 790, D.C.Code §§ 5-701 through 5-719 (1951)).
28. Id. (citing the Act § 6(a)).
29. Id. at 30 (citing the Act § 7(b), (f)). The land to be transferred to public entities was specified
to be "devoted to such public purposes as streets, utilities, recreational facilities, and schools." Id.
(citing the Act § 7(a)). The land to be transferred to private entities was made conditional on the
carrying out of the redevelopment plan. Id. (citing the Act § 7(d)).
30. Id.

31. Id. "Surveys revealed that in Area B, 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4%
needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3%
had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central
heating." Id. The population in this area was 5012 persons, of which 97.5% were African American.
Id.

32. Id. at 31. The district court limited the authority of the Act by holding that the "Agency
could condemn property only for the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and prevention," but not
the areas not considered slums on the grounds that they had the tendency to produce slums. Id. (citing
Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.C.D.C. 1953)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. V). The plaintiffs asserted that the taking was both a violation
of due process and the public use requirement. Id.
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Justice Douglas delivered the opinion for the Berman Court, opening
with an overview of police power. 36 In describing the police power, Justice
Douglas focused on the dichotomy between legislative and judiciary roles,
noting that "the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation."" In reference to the power
of eminent domain, the majority opinion provided that "[t]he role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one."" More specifically, common applications of police power to municipal affairs consist of advancements in
"public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order."3 9 The majority further elaborated that "[m]iserable and disreputable
housing conditions" can be a "blight on the community" and potentially
contrary to the public welfare.4 0
Turning to the propriety of the application of police power to
"blighted areas," the majority focused once again on the role of the legislature, providing that '"i]t is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." 4 1 The Court therefore concluded that when Congress makes determinations based on such
values, it is not the role of the judiciary to appraise them.4 2 Specifically, if
the legislature decides that a given area "should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." 4 3
Further, once the legislature deems a revitalization necessary, there is a
"right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain," and the
"power is merely the means to the end." 44
Throughout, the majority repeatedly refers to the power of eminent
domain as the "means" of executing the project. Not only are the means
by which the object will be attained for Congress to determine, but "the
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to de-

termine, once the public purpose has been established." 4 5 In essence, the
majority proclaimed that all power pertaining to eminent domain resides in
the legislature, including the decision to initiate eminent domain proceedings, as well as the authority to exercise the power by any means necessary
as long as a "public purpose has been established." 4 6 Elaborating on this
point, the majority maintained that the public end, or public purpose, "may
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 31-32.
at 32.

at 32-33.
at 33.

(emphasis added).
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be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government." 4 7
After the majority established the legislature's expansive authority to
establish both the means and the purpose of eminent domain proceedings,
it turned to the specific issue of whether project areas should be addressed
on a structure-by-structure basis or, as the Agency did in the underlying
action, the area addressed as a whole. 4 8 The majority reasoned that it was
important to redesign the project area as a whole to eliminate the slumcausing conditions and that a "piecemeal approach" would be only a palliative, or mitigating solution. 49 Once again, the majority deemed this issue a
legislative question and "not for the courts to oversee the choice of the
boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area."50
In conclusion, the Court held that "[i]f the Agency considers it necessary in
carrying out the redevelopment project to take full title to the real property
involved, it may do so. It is not for the courts to determine whether it is
necessary for successful consummation of the project .

. .

. The rights of

these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."51 Essentially, Berman stands for the proposition that a legislature's
determination of public justifications for a proposed taking should neither
be disrupted by courts nor carried out on a piecemeal basis.
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff:
The Redistribution of Land via Eminent Domain

Approximately thirty years after Berman, the Court was again confronted by the public use question in Hawaii Housing Authority v.

Midkiff. In 1984, the Supreme Court liberally construed the "public use
requirement" to encompass the redistribution of concentrated property
ownership to a wider population of residents.5 The Hawaii Legislature
redressed the overwhelmingly concentrated land ownership throughout the
Hawaiian Islands in the Land Reform Act of 1967 (the "Act").5 4 The Act
"created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts" and transferring
47. Id. at 33-34. This principle that eminent domain is proper even when commenced through a
private enterprise is of great importance in the instant case.
48. Id. The plaintiffs argued that "since their building does not imperil health or safety nor
contribute to the making of a slum or a blighted area, it cannot be swept into a redevelopment plan by
the mere dictum of the Planning Commission or the Commissioners." Id. at 34.
49. Id. The district court limited the Agency's authority by holding that the Act only gave it the
authority to address the slums but not the areas around the slums that allegedly tended to produce
slums. Id. at 35.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 36.
52. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
53. Id.
54. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516 (LexisNexis 2007); see Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232-33. The Hawaii
Legislature discovered that 49% of the state's land was owned by the government, but also that another
47% of the land was owned by only seventy-two private landowners. Id. at 232. The legislature concluded that this concentrated land ownership skewed the residential market, inflated land prices, and
injured the public tranquility and welfare of the state. Id.
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the ownership of these condemned parcels to the existing lessees.5 5 Pursuant to the Act, the Hawaiian Housing Authority ("HHA") ordered certain
landowners to submit to compulsory arbitration.5 6 The appellees filed suit,
asking for the Act to be declared unconstitutional?. The Supreme Court
declined,58 holding that it did not violate the public use requirement of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.59
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for the Court. 60 The majority
set forth that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign's police powers."6 1 Therefore, the role of courts in
reviewing a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use is
'an extremely narrow' one." 6 2 In describing the narrow judicial role in reviewing a public use, the majority set forth that a taking will be consistent
with the Public Use Clause as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."6 1Inshort, the legislature's determination that the
overwhelmingly concentrated state of land ownership served as a public
purpose for which the power of eminent domain was necessary was a "comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure. "64 Further, "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational," the debates pertaining to the wisdom of the takings "are not to be carried out in the federal courts."65 Accordingly, the
majority held that the Act passed the scrutiny of the public use requirement.66 Building on Berman, the Midkiff Court reaffirmed the supreme
deference accorded to public use determinations by legislatures.6 7
The Court also addressed the validity of the Act in reference to the
fact that the property was to be transferred from private owners to private
beneficiaries. 68 Specifically, "[t]he mere fact that property taken outright
55. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. "Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on singlefamily residential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to ask the
Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they live. When [twenty-five]
eligible tenants, or tenants on half the lots in the tract, whichever is less, file appropriate applications,
the Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether the acquisition by the [s]tate of
all or part of the tract will 'effectuate the public purposes' of the Act." Id. (citations omitted). If HHA
finds public purposes served, it is then authorized to designate the land for acquisition. Id. at 233-34.
56. Id. at 234.
57. Id. at 234-35.

58. The district court declared the compulsory arbitration and compensation formulae provisions
of the Act unconstitutional, but that "the Act's goals were within the bounds of the [s]tate's police
powers." Id. at 235 (citing Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62 (Haw. D.C. 1979)). The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Act did not meet the public use requirement. Tom, 702 F.2d 788.
59. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239 (citing U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV). The Court decided another
question of law pertaining to whether the district court abused its discretion in not abstaining from the
exercise of its jurisdiction. Id. at 236. The Court held that no abstention was required. Id.
60. Id. at 231.
61. Id. at 240 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
62. Id. (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
63. Id. at 241.
64. Id. at 242.
65. Id. at 242-43.
66. Id. at 243.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose." 69
Here, the Act's public purpose of redressing the concentration of land
ownership and the consequential market failure was advanced without the
state ever taking actual possession of the land.70 The fact that the state
would never take actual possession of the land was deemed irrelevant by
the Court, declaring that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause." 7 '
C. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New York State Urban Development
Corp.: The Second Circuit's Take on
the Public Use Requirement

The Goldstein opinion is largely based on the Supreme Court precedent outlined in this Note, but the majority also relies heavily on the Second Circuit precedent set forth in Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New York
State Urban Development Corp. ("Rosenthal"). 2 In 1980, defendants Ur-

ban Development Corporation ("UDC") implemented a plan to redevelop
the Times Square vicinity in New York City.73 UDC's stated goals were "to
eliminate blight on 42nd Street between Broadway and Eighth Avenue, to
revitalize this vital crossroad and integrate it into the theatrical, cultural[,]
and commercial life of the city." 74 The site for the project would be acquired and assembled through the power of eminent domain, and "[t]he
actual construction of the buildings ... [would] be undertaken by [a] designated private developer, defendant Park Tower Realty, of which defendant
Klein is a principal."" A significant issue in this case revolved around one
of the towers to be constructed which would be built partially on the site
then occupied by the Rosenthals' building.76
The Rosenthals ("Plaintiffs") asserted that their building was "structurally sound, attractively maintained, fully occupied, and in no way
blighted."" They maintained that because their building did not contribute
to the spread of blight, the condemnation was "not rationally related to the
UDC's stated goal of combatting blight." 78 Plaintiffs claimed the taking
was unconstitutional on two grounds: First, the building was condemned
69. Id. at 243-44.

70. Id. at 244.
71. Id.

72. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 45.

74. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (quoting Compl. 16) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. ("The project consist[ed] of several elements: Renovation of nine theaters on 42nd
Street, subways station improvements, a new hotel, a large wholesale merchandise mart, and four new
office towers . . . . "). The buildings to be constructed would "be leased to Park Tower [Realty] on a
long-term basis and operated by Park Tower as . . . office buildings" in return for Park Tower making
contributions toward the subway and theater improvements. Id.
76. Id. at 613-14. The Rosenthals owned and did business in this building for twenty-five years at
the time of the action. Id. at 614.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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solely for the profit of a private entity, Klein, which was alleged to be an
unconstitutional private purpose; second, the state's use of the condemnation to raise funds for the subway and theater renovations was an unconstitutional form of taxation. 7 9
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim, holding that the taking was "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 0 First, the court addressed whether the project addressed a legitimate public purpose, finding that the project did in fact
"address legitimate public purposes in a reasonable manner."8 1 Second,
the court addressed whether the condemnation of Plaintiffs' building was
within the law of eminent domain, noting that "[i]t makes no difference
that the property will be transferred to private developers, for the power of
eminent domain is merely the means to the end." 8 2 Further, it did not matter that Plaintiffs' building was in good repair because "community redevelopment programs need not . . . be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot,

building by building."83 Accordingly, the court concluded that "[w]hen the

legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, . . . debates. . . are not to be carried out in the federal courts." 8 4 Therefore, it is

clear that the Second Circuit in Rosenthal adopted a similar level of deference to the legislature as set forth by Berman and Midkiff, as well as the
low rational-basis standard for asserted public justifications.
D.

Kelo v. City of New London: Economic Redevelopment Takings and
the Introduction to Pretextual Takings

In 2005, the Court was presented with a new spin on eminent domain,
focusing on the concept of economic redevelopment takings in Kelo v. City
of New London.8 5 In 1990, a state agency designated New London, Connecticut (the "City"), a "distressed municipality."8 6 "In 1998, the City's unemployment rate was nearly double that of the [s]tate, and its population of
just under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 1920."17 These conditions
prompted officials to target the City for economic revitalization and appoint the New London Development Corporation (the "NLDC"), a nonprofit entity, to plan economic development.8 8 The pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. made plans to build a $300 million research facility on the
site.8 "[L]ocal planners hoped that Pfizer would draw new business to the
79. Id. at 614-15.

80. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. Stat Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 46. The court stated that it had already taken note of the area's blighted condition. Id.;
see Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. City of New York, 672 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. Rosenthal, 771 F.2d at 45 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984)).
83. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35) (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 238) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
86. Id. at 473.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

2011]

WHEN THE LEGISLATURE ROBS PETER TO PAY PAUL

97

area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation." 90 Subsequently, the NLDC finalized a development plan for ninety acres of the
City9 1 "In addition to creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to
'build momentum for the revitalization of downtown New London,' "the
plan was designed to beautify the City and create leisure and recreational
opportunities.92
In 2000, "the NLDC initiated the condemnation proceedings that gave
rise to this case." 9 3 Susette Kelo and eight other petitioners ("Petitioners")
owned fifteen properties within the Project area. 94 There were no allegations that any of these properties were blighted or in poor disrepair, but
they were nonetheless condemned because they happened to be in the designated development area. 95 Petitioners' complaint alleged that "the taking of their properties would violate the 'public use' restriction in the Fifth
Amendment." 9 6 The United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to
determine whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of
economic development satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth
Amendment."
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in this 5-4 decision
upholding the constitutionality of the taking at issue. 98 Initially, Justice
Stevens described a strong dichotomy between two classes of takings: First,
"it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of
A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation"; second, "it is equally clear that a
State may transfer property from one private party to another if future 'use
by the public' is the purpose of the taking." 99 Concerning the first class,
the majority made it quite clear that "the City would be forbidden from
taking [P]etitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on
a particular private party."' 00 Further, "[n]or would the City be allowed to
take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit." 101 However, the Court found
90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
[ninety]-acre

at 473-74. The development plan encompassed seven parcels. Id. at 474.
at 474-75 (citing App. Br. at 92).
at 475. "The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of most of the real estate in the
area, but its negotiations with petitioners failed." Id.

94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. V) (internal citation omitted). "The Superior Court granted a
permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of' some of the properties, but denied the order
concerning others. Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all of
the City's takings were valid and that the economic development plan qualified as a valid public use.
Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
97. Id at 477 (citing U.S. CONsr. amend. V).
98. Id. at 470. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
99. Id. at 477.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
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that the City's development plan was not adopted to benefit a particular

class of individuals. 1 02
Next, the majority analyzed the boundaries of the public use requirement, providing that the "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general public." 103 Justice
Stevens noted that the "use by the public test" was not only hard to administer, but it was also impractical in modern-day societies.'" Accordingly,
the Court adopted the broader interpretation of "public use" as the "public
purpose" requirement adopted in the late nineteenth century. 0 5
After providing an extensive background of caselaw, the opinion, like
many before it, referenced the role of jurisprudence pertaining to the public use issue and emphasized that it is proper to "afford[ ] legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power." 106 Particularly, the Court declared the City's "determination
that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic
rejuvenation" was entitled to judicial deference. 0 7
Petitioners urged the Court "to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development [did] not qualify as a public use."' 08 Yet, the Court
refused to do so, primarily because it deemed promoting economic development "a traditional and long-accepted function of government."' 09 Also,
Petitioners urged the Court to "require a 'reasonable certainty' that the
expected public benefits will actually accrue.""10 Relying on Midkiff, again
the Court refused, reasoning that such a requirement would be "an even
greater departure" from precedent."'
1. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Of particular importance in Justice Kennedy's concurrence is his assertion that the pretext argument discussed in the majority's opinion is appropriate for public use analyses.112 Justice Kennedy did not contend that the
Midkiff "rational-basis test" should be overruled, but he merely asserted
that the "rational-basis test" should be used in unison with a pretext analysis.113 Specifically, "[a] court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is
102. Id.

103. Id. at 479 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.at 480; see Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
106. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 484.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 487.

111. Id. at 487-88 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational,
our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts.")
(citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)).
112. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
113. Id. at491.
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intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.... "114 Simply stated, if the public benefits alleged by
the party invoking eminent domain powers are merely pretextual, the taking does not meet the public use requirement.
2. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined, dissented from the majority opinion. 1 5 The dissent proclaimed that "[u]nder the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded . . . ."1" Further, Justice
O'Connor provided that the government "cannot take their property for
the private use of other owners simply because the new owners may make
more productive use of the property." 17 This dissent did not completely
foreclose the avenue of transferring privately owned land to another private entity via eminent domain. 1 In fact, this dissent provided that the
power of eminent domain may be utilized to "transfer private property to
private parties . . . who make the property available for the public's use-

such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium."" 9 Also, in certain
circumstances, takings that serve a public purpose may also be constitutional even if the property is destined to be subsequently transferred to a

private entity. 120
Justice O'Connor first considered the constitutionality of economic development takings an issue of first impression, and second, deemed the takings unconstitutional.121 In distinguishing this case from Berman and
Midkiff, the dissent asserted that this case was different because, here, Petitioners' homes were not the source of any harm.122 Consequently, the majority "holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to
ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long
as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the
public-such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic
pleasure."1 23 An economic redevelopment plan simply takes private property and transfers it to another private entity to be put to a "better" use.124
In Berman and Midkiff, private property transferred to other private entities was deemed proper because "the extraordinary, precondemnation use
114.
115.
116.
limitation
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice O'Connor deemed the majority's decision an abandonment of a "long-held basic
on government power." Id.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 500-01.
Id.
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of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society."' 25 Justice
O'Connor's dissent represents the common fear of many Americans that
the Kelo decision may allow the legislature to permit broad property reallocation powers through the power of eminent domain.
3. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas in his dissent agrees with Justice O'Connor on the
point that "economic development" takings are improper and "erase the
Public Use Clause from our Constitution."1 2 6 Justice Thomas also addresses the deference afforded to legislative decisions regarding public
use.127 He finds no reason to "afford[ ] almost insurmountable deference
to legislative conclusions that a use serves a 'public use.' "128 Further, "it is
most implausible that the Framers intended to defer to legislatures as to
what satisfies the Public Use Clause."' 29 Practically speaking, Justice
Thomas also expresses concern over the implications of the majority's decision: "Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes
is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass
any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities." 3 0
IV.

INSTANT CASE

Circuit Judge Katzmann authored the opinion of the Second Circuit in
Goldstein v. Pataki.'3 ' Chief Judge Jacobs and Circuit Judge Livingston
joined the opinion.132 Appellants asserted that the proffered public justifications for the proposed taking were merely pretextual and that the true
purpose was to confer a benefit upon a private entity. 1 3 3 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court and held that Appellants did not establish a
viable Fifth Amendment claim.134
The opinion opened with a brief review of the power of eminent domain and the limitations provided by the Fifth Amendment, specifically the
public use requirement.'
In the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
public use requirement, the opinion noted that the language guarantees
that "one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another
private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."' 3 6 The opinion drew a distinction between the roles of the
125. Id. at 500.
126. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 517.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 521.
131. 516 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2008).
132. Id
133. Id. at52-53.
134. Id. at53.
135. Id. at57.
136. Id. (citing Thompson v. Gonsol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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legislature and federal courts, providing that federal courts "address[ ]
what type of governmental action constitutes a taking and what level of
compensation is just," but it is the legislature's role to determine "whether
a taking fulfills the public[ ]use requirement."'
Nevertheless, the court
did note that federal courts play a role, though a narrow one, in "reviewing
a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the
eminent domain power is equated with the police power." 3 8 Accordingly,
the court stated that its "review of a legislature's public[ ]use determination
is limited such that 'where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,' . . . the compensated

taking of private property for urban renewal or community redevelopment
is not proscribed by the Constitution."1 39
After delineating the scope of the Second Circuit's judicial review, the
court addressed Appellants' claims that the "alleged 'public benefits' "
were "nonexistent" or "pretextual."1 40 The court concisely diffused the
claim that the "alleged 'public benefits' " were "nonexistent," stating that
Appellants effectively conceded a complete defense to a public use challenge: "that viewed objectively, the Project bears at least a rational relationship to several well-established categories of public uses, among them
the redress of blight, the creation of affordable housing, the creation of a
public open space, and various mass-transit improvements."1 41
Next, the court addressed Appellants' claim that the "proffered public
uses" were merely " 'pretextual,' not because they [were] false, but because
they [were] not the real reason for the Project's approval." 1 42 Appellants
claimed that the Takings Area was never declared "blighted" and " 'never
designated for redevelopment' until three years after the Project was announced," while the Renewal Area was first declared "blighted" in 1968.143
In addition, Appellants claimed that the creation of "affordable housing"
public use was also pretextual on the ground that "the Project is comprised
of luxury housing because 69% of the housing units will be market rate,

luxury units"144
In response to the pretextual claims, the court held that "redevelopment of a blighted area, even standing alone, represents a 'classic example
137. Id.

138. Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)). In Midkiff, Justice
O'Connor explained the scope of federal judicial review in this area: "Judicial deference is required
because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should
be advanced by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making
such determinations within their respective spheres of authority. Thus, if a legislature, state or federal,
determines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its
determination that the taking will serve a public use." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 (citation omitted).
139. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 58 (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)).
140. Id
141. Id. at 58-59.
142. Id. at 59.
143. Id.
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of a taking for a public use.' "145 Further, noting that the complaint conceded that "at least 550 below-market units . . . are slated to be built in the
first phase of development," the court declared that it did not matter that
New York had enlisted the services of a private developer to execute such
improvements. 1 4 6 Accordingly, the panel held that once a "valid public use
to which the project is rationally related" was discerned, it "makes no difference that the property will be transferred to private developers, for the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end."1 47
Appellants also sought relief on the ground that their individual lots
were not blighted.' 4 8 In response, the court held that it was without authority to grant relief because "once it has been shown that the surrounding area is blighted, the state may condemn unblighted parcels as part of an
overall plan to improve a blighted area."1 49 Furthermore, the panel rejected "the argument that the ESDC [was] undeserving of such deference
because it [was] merely a state agency." 50
The court then returned to the "pretext" claim, first addressing its history and its application to the power of eminent domain.' The landowners acknowledged the Project's relationship to several public uses, but
contended that the public uses were mere pretexts for the officials with
approval authority to confer a private benefit on the private developer,
Brett Ratner.15 2 The Second Circuit rejected the argument, holding as
follows:
[W]e must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the
Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman,

Midkiff, and over a century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public use as a
means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various government officials who approved it.153
In conclusion, the Second Circuit, after rejecting Appellants' Fifth
Amendment challenge, also rejected the due process and equal protection
claims Appellants brought for essentially the same reasons as the district
court.' 54 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. 5 5
145. Id. (quoting Rosenthal, 771 F.2d at 46).
146. Id. at 59-60.

147. Id. at 60 (quoting Rosenthal, 771 F.2d at 46).
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 297 (2d Cir. 1985)).
150. Id. The panel noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has expressly extended deference in such
matters to both Congress and its authorized agencies." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
151. Id. at 60-61. The issue of pretext finds its origins in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 478 (2005) ("under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when [the] actual purpose was to bestow
a private benefit").
152. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 65.
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ANALYSIS

A. The Origin of the Pretext Claim under the Public Use Clause
The Courts in Berman and Midkiff set forth the deferential standard
for courts to use in determining whether a taking is consistent with the
Public Use Clause. The Midkiff Court provided that a taking is consistent
with the Public Use Clause as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."' 56 This extremely deferential standard carved a very
narrow role for the judiciary in determining whether a taking has a sufficient public use within the context of the Fifth Amendment. The settled
standard was put to the test when the Court was confronted by the difficult
and controversial Kelo decision.
When confronted by the economic development taking in Kelo, the
difficulty of the decision was bolstered by the fact that Justice O'Connor,
who substantially contributed to the deferential standard by writing for the
majority in Midkiff, wrote a sobering dissent, eloquently outlining the dissenters' reluctance to extend the Berman and Midkiff standard to this area
of takings.15 7 However, readers need not skip to the Kelo dissents to find
reservations among the justices in extending the deferential standard to this
area of takings. The majority, in a subtle attempt to provide a safeguard,
proclaimed: "Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the
mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a
private benefit."' 8 While the majority opinion did not elaborate on what it
specifically meant by this statement, the proverbial cloud was thrown into
the air. Fortunately, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion that provides readers with a little insight into what was meant by "pretext."' 59
At this point, it is important to note the utility of concurring opinions.
The United States Supreme Court once stated that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds." 1 0 Therefore, while Justice Kennedy's concurrence is
not the holding of the Court, it is instructive of what the Court would hold
when faced with a fact pattern more susceptible to the pretextual challenge.
Justice Kennedy likened the deferential standard of Berman and
Midkiff to the rational-basis test used in reviewing due process and equal
protection cases.1 61 Significantly, Justice Kennedy noted: "The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not, however, alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular,
155. Id.
156. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
157. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494-505 (O'Connor, dissenting).
158. Id. at 478.
159. Id. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490.
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favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause." 1 6 2 In short, even under the
deferential standard of Berman and Midkiff, takings with stated public benefits that are incidental or pretextual to an actual intent to provide benefits
to private entities are in violation of the Public Use Clause.163 Likewise,
"[a] court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits."164
For further insight, Justice Kennedy directs our attention to the rational-basis review courts utilize in Equal Protection Clause cases in determining whether government classifications should be found in violation
when a class of private parties is injured, "with only incidental or pretextual
public justifications."1 65 In Cleburne, a zoning ordinance excluding group
homes for the mentally retarded from permitted uses in the zoning district
was found to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 6 6 Justice
Kennedy's citation to Cleburne is significant because the Cleburne decision
involved judicial scrutiny for determination of legislation's true purpose.
The Cleburne Court went through the rational-basis analysis providing
that "legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and
others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."167
From reading this language, it is quite clear why Justice Kennedy likened
the Equal Protection Clause analysis to that of the deferential standard of
Midkiff which provides that a taking is consistent with the Public Use
Clause as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 1 6 8 The Cleburne Court considered the city's arguments that "the
ordinance [was] aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets," but found the city's arguments meritless. 16 9 It is evident that the Court looked beyond the stated purpose of the
ordinance and attempted to determine if the stated purpose was also the
true purpose. In essence, the Court looked beyond the ordinance's stated
pretextual purpose of lessening population concentration and determined
that the ordinance was actually "an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." 1 70 Justice Kennedy's reference to Cleburne in his Kelo concurrence called upon courts applying rational-basis review under the Public
Use Clause to look beyond the stated purpose of takings and determine
whether the stated purpose is merely pretextual to an intention to confer a
benefit upon a private entity. 171
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.; see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450 (1985).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
Id. at 446.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
Id.
Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432).
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The Availability and Application of the Pretextual Challenge

While both the Kelo majority and Justice Kennedy's concurrence open
the door to claims of pretextual takings, various questions concerning the
concept remain unanswered. Specifically, did the Kelo decision create a
challenge to takings on the grounds that the stated public use was pretextual? If so, what is the standard and proper analysis for a pretextual claim?
It is quite clear that courts have embraced the idea of the pretextual
claim, as well as recognized the availability of the claim as a takings challenge pursuant to the Public Use Clause.' 7 2 The court in Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp. recognized the difficulty associated with

the challenge and the need for a remedy: "The government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property owner
must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate that
the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual." 7 3 The Second Circuit and the district court recognized the availability of the pretextual claim in the Goldstein proceedings, but the appropriate application
remains unclear.
1. Availability of the Pretextual Challenge
In Goldstein, the heart of the complaint was the allegation that the
Project was not driven by legitimate concern for the public benefit, but was
actually substantially motivated by intentions of government officials to
benefit Brett Ratner, the Project's primary developer.' 74 In short, Plaintiffs alleged that the stated public uses for the Project were pretexts for a
private taking in violation of the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 75 Pertaining to availability, the Goldstein district court held that a
"pretext argument provided a valid basis for a public[ ]use challenge under
the Supreme Court's decision in [Kelo]."176
Courts have generally recognized the pretextual challenge created by
Kelo. In Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp., the Third Circuit

recognized the availability of a pretextual taking challenge, providing that
"[w]e recognize that the Supreme Court has suggested that a taking may be
invalid under the Public Use Clause where an avowed public purpose is
actually a 'mere pretext' to an 'actual purpose. . . to bestow a private benefit.' "177 In Western Seafood Co. v. United States, the Fifth Circuit refused
to address whether a heightened standard should be applied when the
172. See Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007);
Carole Media LLC v. N.J. Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 311 (3d. Cir. 2008); W. Seafood Co. v. United
States, 202 Fed. Appx. 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001); MHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-0003785 VRW, 2008 WL 440282, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008).
173. Franco, 930 A.2d at 169.
174. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 2008).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 55 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Carole Media LLC, 550 F.3d at 311 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478).
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plaintiff alleged a pretextual taking, but the court did consider the allegations and discussed whether the city exhibited favoritism, implying recognition of the pretextual challenge.'7
In 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, a district

court case out of California, the court stated that "[n]o judicial deference is
required, for instance, where the ostensible public use is demonstrably
pretextual."1 79 The 99 Cents court further elaborated by declaring that officials deciding to take private property and later trying to justify the decision in court "merely by positing a 'conceivable public purpose' to which
the taking is rationally related" would be in violation of the Takings
Clause. 80 It is of particular interest that this decision was from 2001, approximately four years prior to the Kelo decision.
In a more recent district court case out of northern California, MHC
Financing, Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, the court, citing Kelo, not only recog-

nized the availability of a pretextual challenge, but also found the asserted
public purposes to be pretextual."' Accordingly, the court held that the
taking was not for the public use and in violation of the Fifth Amendment.18 2 In Franco, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia proclaimed that "Kelo makes clear that there is room for a landowner to claim
that the legislature's declaration of a public purpose is a pretext designed
to mask a taking for private purposes."183
2.

Application of the Pretextual Challenge

Although Kelo opened the door for the pretextual challenge, and
courts, including the Second Circuit in Goldstein, have certified the challenge, the appropriate standard remains unclear. The deferential standard
of Berman and Midkiff limited the role of the judiciary to a rational-basis
assessment. The Kelo majority "rocked the boat" with one sentence: "Nor
would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."' 8 4
Other than some minor discussion of development plans and whether the
identity of the proposed private developer was known, the Kelo majority
provided little additional guidance or explanation.18 5 However, the majority's subtle reference to a different or additional scrutiny for the courts into
a legislature's proposed public use opened the door to a fair share of litigation. Accordingly, considering the lack of guidance or criteria for such litigation, the standard for courts to apply is far from clear.
178. W. Seafood v. United States, 202 Fed. Appx. 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006).
179. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D.
Cal. 2001).
180. Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)).
181. MHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-00-03785 VRW, 2008 WL 440282. at *25 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 29, 2008).
182. Id. at *25.
183. Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007).
184. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
185. Id. at 478-80.
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In Goldstein, the district court, in a very cursory analysis of plaintiffs'
pretext claim, held that "even if [p]laintiffs could prove every allegation in
the Amended Complaint, a reasonable juror would not be able to conclude
that the public purposes offered in support of the Project are 'mere pretexts' within the meaning of Kelo." 86 It appears that the district court did
nothing more than apply the rational-basis test, and, after finding that the
test was met, ignored the pretext claim. The Second Circuit, like the district court, appears to have dismissed the prospect of any additional analysis into the pretext allegations as heightened scrutiny contrary to caselaw,
declaring that "[a]llowing such a claim to go forward, founded only on
mere suspicion, would add an unprecedented level of intrusion into the
process." 1 8 7 Additionally, the Second Circuit explicitly confirmed its dismissive attitude, providing the following:
[W]e must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the
Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman,

Midkiff, and over a century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public use as a
means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various government officials who approved it.18 8
This statement and the corresponding perception is where the Second Circuit erred in its analysis. Here, the Second Circuit delineated a dichotomy
between the judicial deference of Berman and Midkiff and a "close scrutiny" implied by pretextual allegations, but the clear-cut dichotomy is unwarranted. The rational-basis test adopted in Midkiff can coexist with a
pretext analysis while remaining deferential. As I will further discuss below, the proper analysis is not the excessively low standard used by the
Second Circuit here, but a rational-basis test similar to the Cleburne Equal
Protection Clause analysis referenced by Justice Kennedy in his Kelo

concurrence.1 89
It is important to note that the Second Circuit did not dismiss the idea
of a pretextual taking altogether. In fact, the Goldstein opinion specifically
preserved "preserving the possibility that a fact pattern may one day arise
in which the circumstances of the approval process so greatly undermine
the basic legitimacy of the outcome reached that a closer objective scrutiny
of the justification being offered is required."' 9 0 While it is laudable that
the court appreciated the prospect of unjustifiable use of the eminent domain power and the great value of an objective analysis, guidelines for determining the presence of such a situation and the corresponding
mechanics for an objective analysis remain to be seen.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62.
Id.
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47).
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63.
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This brings us back to the same question; now that we know there is an
available pretextual challenge, what is the standard? In the end, the Second Circuit did recognize Justice Kennedy's reference to the rational-basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause, but in a conclusory manner,
dismissed the value of his proffered analytical mechanisms, writing "even
assuming, arguendo, we were to apply a version of Justice Kennedy's standard here, we would scrutinize objectively and find no 'plausible' accusations of favoritism." 19 ' This question elicits two main questions: 1) What
does it mean to "scrutinize objectively," and 2) what are "plausible accusations of favoritism?" As will be discussed below, these are two very important and relevant questions.
It is also important to see how other courts have analyzed pretextual
challenges. In Carole Media LLC, the Third Circuit made specific reference to Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence, providing that "aside from
making a conclusory allegation that N[ew] J[ersey] Transit engaged in the
alleged taking 'solely to benefit a private party . . .,' Carole Media has not

made 'a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism.' "192
In MHC Financing, Ltd., the court combined the Midkiff standard and
the Kelo pretextual challenge into a two-part test, providing that the plaintiff, in order to succeed in challenging the taking under the Public Use
Clause, must prove that the proffered public purposes were palpably without reasonable foundation, 9 3 "or that the [c]ity imposed the [o]rdinance
under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to
bestow a private benefit." 194 The MHC court found the proffered public
purposes to be pretextual, and thus unjustifiable, because of prior attempts
by the city to transfer the ownership of the property at issue for different

purposes.195

The Franco court may have summed up its standard most precisely,
providing as follows:
We conclude that a reviewing court must focus primarily on
benefits the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking. If the property is being transferred to another private
party, and the benefits to the public are only "incidental" or
"pretextual," a "pretext" defense may well succeed. On the
other hand, if the record discloses (in the words of the trial
court) that the taking will serve "an overriding public purpose" and that the proposed development "will provide substantial benefits to the public," the courts must defer to the
191.
192.
193.
Cal. Jan.

Id. at 64 n.10 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Carole Media LLC v. N.J. Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
MIHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-00-03785 VR W, 2008 WL 440282, at *19 (N.D.
29, 2008); see Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).

194. MHC Fin., Ltd., 2008 WL 440282, at *19 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478). It is noteworthy that
this case was decided under regulatory takings grounds.
195. Id. at *25.
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judgment of the legislature. Harder cases will lie between

these extremes. 196
C. A New Standard Based on Justice Kennedy's Kelo Concurrence

The Kelo majority recognized the validity of pretextual challenges to
takings, but we must look to Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence for further guidance. It is well settled by Berman, Midkiff, and over a century of
precedent that the Public Use Clause analysis is one of deference to the
legislature consisting of a rational-basis review. However, Justice Kennedy
urged that courts applying rational-basis review under the Public Use
Clause apply a more stringent standard for determining whether a taking
"is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits."' 9 7 The Second Circuit in Goldstein considered
this more stringent standard a great departure from the well-settled rule of
deference.1 9 8 However, Justice Kennedy's concurrence merely set forth a
standard that supplements instead of supplants rational-basis review.' 99 In
short, the pretextual challenge is an objective analysis intended to ensure
that the proposed public benefits asserted by a legislature are in fact rationally related to the true purpose of the proposed taking, rather than pretextual public justifications. 200
1. A Burden-Shifting Analysis for Determining Whether a "Plausible
Accusation of Impermissible Favoritism" Has Been Made
Justice Kennedy provided that "[a] court confronted with a plausible
accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the
objection as a serious one and review the record to see if it has merit." 201
Such review should be made "with the presumption that the government's
actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose. "202 While
Justice Kennedy did provide us with a test for courts to use in determining
whether a condemnee challenging a taking has raised a judicial question of
pretextual public justifications, the mechanics of making such a determination were not set forth and have caused confusion for lower courts. It is
apparent that Justice Kennedy recognizes courts' obligation to determine
whether the party challenging the taking has made a "plausible accusation
of impermissible favoritism." 203 If plausible accusations are made, courts
should review the facts and determine whether the accusations have merit.
This scrutiny does represent a more stringent evaluation of the taking than
Berman and Midkiff, however, the standard Justice Kennedy urges is not
an additional level of scrutiny, but rather a procedure for the judiciary to
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Franco v. Nat'I Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173-74 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62.

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491-93 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450 (1985).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Id.
Id.
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determine whether the proposed public benefits are in fact rationally related to the goals of the proposed taking.20 4
To apply Justice Kennedy's proposed standard, courts must first delineate what it means to make a "plausible accusation of favoritism." One
purpose of this Note is to set forth a workable standard utilizing a burdenshifting analysis for courts to use in determining whether a condemnee has
made such an accusation. This burden-shifting analysis is best applied in
the pleading stage as a preliminary inquiry into whether a condemnee has
set forth a "plausible accusation of favoritism" and thus deserves his day in
court.
The tripartite burden-shifting analysis proposed in this Note originated
in the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,20 5
which involved employment discrimination under Title VJJ. 2 0 6 Since McDonnell Douglas, courts have expanded the application of the burdenshifting analysis to areas outside of Title VII to include land use cases, such
as discrimination suits under the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA")20 7 and
Land Use Retaliation claims. 2 0 8
I do agree with the Second Circuit that the pretextual claim analysis
should be made on an objective basis.2 09 This means that courts should
evaluate a pretextual challenge by applying a series of objective factors to
the pleadings and ascertaining whether a "plausible accusation of favoritism" toward a private entity exists. A difficult question is what objective
factors must be present for the challenger to satisfy her burden of alleging a
"plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism." One thing to remember when considering these factors is that they are not just factors for determining whether a taking does not meet the public use requirement, but
actually an objective series of factors for determining whether the proposed
public benefits of a taking fails to be rationally related to the true purpose
of the taking on the grounds that the proposed public benefits are merely
pretextual to a true purpose of conferring benefits onto particular, favored

private entities. 2 10

204. Id.
205. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
206. Id.
207. Graoch Assocs. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metdo Human Relations Comm'n, 508 F.3d
366 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying burden-shifting to FHA race discrimination disparate claim); Sharpvisions, Inc. v. Borough of Plum, 475 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (utilizing the burden-shifting
analysis to determine whether a borough's conditional use permit requirement discriminated against
persons with disabilities); Texas v. Crest Asset Mgmt., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 722 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
208. Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying a
burden-shifting analysis to a First Amendment Retaliation Claim to determine whether government
justifications were pretextual).
209. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2008).
210. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491-93 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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In McDonnell Douglas, the tripartite burden-shifting analysis provided
a means for determining whether indirect evidence established discriminatory intent. 1 1 Likewise, a pretextual challenge to public justification concerns indirect evidence rather than direct evidence of alternative intent.
Accordingly, a burden-shifting analysis in the takings context is a practicable mechanism for assessing whether conferring private benefit is pretextual in the face of asserted public justifications. 1 2
The first step in the burden-shifting analysis is the prima facie case of
the condemnee. In order to establish a prima facie case of pretextual private involvement, a condemnee must put forward specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations which establish pretext.2 13 Consistent with the Second
Circuit's requirement for objective evidence, this prima facie prong should
be established through a set of objective factors based on a totality of the
circumstances. 214 The next section develops factors that, when pleaded,
satisfy the plaintiff's initial burden to plead sufficient facts to create a
"plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism." The burden is on the
plaintiff to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. 21 5 If the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden, the burden will shift to
the condemnor to show legitimate public justification.
Factor 1:

Identity of the Transferee

The first factor pertains to the identity of the proposed transferee. In
Kelo, Justice Kennedy put great weight on the fact that the City of New
London had not chosen a private developer prior to asserting the public
justifications for the taking.2 16 In fact, evidence showed "the substantial
commitment of public funds by the [s]tate to the development project
before most of the private beneficiaries were known." 217 Logically speaking, for the true purpose of a transfer to be the conferring of a benefit to
particular private entities, the identity of the proposed transferee or beneficiary must be known or established prior to the statutorily provided taking
mechanism has been set in motion. If the transferee is known before the
public justifications are asserted, it is more likely the taking is intended to
benefit the private entity and not the public.
In situations, such as Kelo, when funding is committed to a project
prior to selecting a transferee, it would be very hard to imagine a set of
circumstances in which the proposed public benefits were mere pretexts for
conferring benefit on "particular, favored private entities." 218 On the other
hand, in Goldstein, the City knew Mr. Ratner was to be the developer
211. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
212. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. CR. ECON. REV. 173, 216 (2009).

213. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
214. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63.
215. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
216. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-92 (2005) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 491.
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throughout the entire process; he actually proposed the idea to begin
with.2 1 9 While this factor is not determinative, the fact that a beneficiary of
a taking is known prior to an assertion of public justifications by the taking
authority serves as an objective factor for a court to use in determining
whether said proposed public justifications are merely pretextual.
Factor2:

Transferee Selection Process

The second factor inevitably stems from the first factor. After placing
such great importance on whether the identity of the proposed transferee
or beneficiary is known at the time public justifications were asserted by
the taking authority, it becomes necessary to consider the transferee/beneficiary selection process itself. Scrutinizing the process is particularly important to determine whether there actually was a competitive process.
The large projects inherent to economic development takings are especially
prone to potential corruption and/or private influence.2 2 0 In Daniel Kelly's
article, he asserts that when a local government is capable of selecting a
private party through a competitive process, but chooses not to do so, the
taking should be considered pretextual. 2 2 ' While the extent of this assertion is problematic, the refusal to use a competitive process is indicative of
impermissible favoritism. The absence of a competitive process for the
choosing of a transferee increases the likelihood that the conferring of a
private benefit is the true objective for the taking. A competitive process
demonstrates indifference concerning any benefit that a transferee may
receive.
Factor 3:

Past Behavior

The third type of conduct that demonstrates impermissible favoritism
regards a condemnor's intent to transfer property to or confer benefit upon
a private entity prior to asserting different public justifications for a taking.
This factor relates to the fact pattern and legal conclusions discussed by the
MHC court in determining that the City of Rafael's prior support for the
benefitting private entities to receive the wealth at question led to a finding
of pretextual public purpose in the subsequent taking.2 22 MHC concerned
a regulatory takings issue regarding an ordinance enacted by the City of
San Rafael with various asserted "legitimate governmental interests furthered by the [o]rdinance." 22 3 The court based its finding of a pretextual
taking on the evidence that the city had "persistently supported the tenant's desire to convert the Contempo Marin [mobile home park] to a tenant-owned community," especially evidence that the city mayor sent a
219.

Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 54.

220. Kelly, supra note 212, at 202.
221. Kelly, supra note 212. at 220.
222. See MHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-00-03785 VRW, 2008 WL 440282 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2008).
223. Id. at *20. "The [c]ity advances three purportedly legitimate governmental interests furthered by the [o]rdinance: (1) protection of mobile home owner equity; (2) protection of fixed-income
residents[;] and (3) creation of more affordable housing." Id.
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letter to the tenants of Contempo Marin asking for support in an upcoming
election and specifically promised the tenants that he would continue to
help the tenants acquire ownership of the park. 2 4
This third factor is especially determinative. When accusations are
made of prior efforts by the authority to confer a benefit upon the transferee or beneficiary for reasons different than the public justifications proffered by the taking authority, a "plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism" has been made. Essentially, subsequent justifications varying
from initial justifications with the common outcome of conferring a benefit
to a particular entity demonstrate that the objective was merely the benefit
to the third party and not the justifications asserted subsequently.
Factor4:

Presence of an Integrated Development Plan

The fourth factor comes from the Kelo majority opinion when it suggested that a transfer of property from one private party to another "executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not
presented in this case."225 An integrated development plan provides support for the proposed taking and reasoning for why a particular private
transferee may be well suited for the plan or necessary for the proposed
outcome. A taking that proposes a transfer to a private entity in the absence of an integrated development plan is indicative of impermissible favoritism because no support is set forth for the reasoning behind the
private entities' involvement. This factor not only provides a basis for determining whether a transfer was made under suspicious circumstances, but
also provides for full disclosure. If authorities are required to disclose an
integrated development plan, it will be more difficult to conceal pretextual
intent.
Factor5:

The Balancing Test

The fifth factor lending to a "plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism" is the most complex and probably the most controversial because
it involves a balancing test. In the event that the projected private benefits
outweigh the projected public benefits, a court should see the risk of impermissible favoritism and scrutinize the evidence more closely. This does not
mean every instance in which a private transferee will reap benefits greater
than the benefits projected for the public when a pretextual taking is present. However, when such a plausible accusation is made, a court shall
then scrutinize the taking to determine whether the proposed public purpose is in fact rationally related to the true goals of the proposed taking.
It is not a novel concept for courts to analyze the magnitude of proposed public benefits when confronted by a pretextual challenge, 2 2 6 but
224. Id. at *24. The district court denied summary judgment and ordered a trial to determine
whether the actual purpose of the ordinance was to further the asserted public justifications, or whether
the public justifications were merely a pretext to justify a private taking. Id. at *23.
225. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005).
226. See Franco v. Nat'1 Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173-74 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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there are inherent inadequacies in only analyzing the projected public benefits.2 27 Simply determining whether there are any public benefits does little more than the Berman/Midkiff standards of old. Both the taking
authority and the private beneficiaries have incentive to inflate projected
benefits, and without a frame of reference, the projected benefits will be
insulated from scrutiny. However, a balancing test weighing private benefits against public benefits provides a frame of reference and gives courts
the ability to "see the big picture" and make a decision whether additional
scrutiny is necessary.
This first prong of the burden-shifting analysis may be satisfied on a
totality-of-the-circumstances basis through the set of factors outlined
above. The standard should be one of plausibility. 228 At the pleading
phase, a plaintiff's pretextual challenge likely will be met with a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, as in Goldstein.2 29 In considering a motion for dismissal at this phase, a court should consider the plausibility of
the pleadings and determine whether the plaintiff has made a "plausible
accusation of impermissible favoritism" by setting forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which establish pretext.23 0 If such a plausible
accusation is made, the first prong of the burden-shifting analysis is met,
and the burden would then shift to the government?231
The second step of the burden-shifting analysis pertains to government
justification.2 32 Specifically, step two should require the condemnor to articulate a legitimate justification for private involvement in the taking. 233
The condemnor's burden is to refute the condemnee's prima facie pretext
case by justifying private involvement.
In Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence, he recognized the inadequacies of the supreme deference accorded to legislature in takings.2 34 Essentially, under the traditional analysis, a condemnor, when faced with
allegations of insufficient public justifications, can just direct a court's attention to a number of traditional public purposes, such as eliminating urban blight,23 5 redistribution of concentrated property ownership, 236 and
economic revitalization 2 3 7 to prevail as long as the taking is "rationally related" to the asserted public purpose. 2 3 8
This step in the burden-shifting framework is the juncture at which the
condemnor must demonstrate merit for the asserted public justifications.
227.
228.

See Kelly, supra note 212, at 187-88.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

229. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2008).
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id.
Kelly, supra note 212, at 218.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
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For guidance, courts should look to the Cleburne decision in which the Supreme Court recognized the need to examine the veracity of government
justifications.2 39 In Cleburne, the Court looked beyond the stated purpose
of an ordinance and attempted to determine if the stated purpose was also
the true purpose.240 Likewise, in pretextual takings, courts are charged
with the task of determining whether the condemnor's asserted public justifications are in fact the true purpose of the taking, rather than pretextual to
an intent to confer private benefit.
The condemnor can carry this burden by demonstrating that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is insufficient to demonstrate a pretext.
This can be done by providing evidence refuting the allegations made by
the condemnee in its prima facie case. For example, if a local government
is able to show that a particular private party is necessary because of
knowledge, resources, or ability, and that pre-condemnation private involvement is not possible without designating the party as the post-condemnation developer, then the government might be able to satisfy its
burden.24 1 For the most part, the condemnor's burden is to provide specific
justification for the private involvement and its necessity for the promotion
of the asserted public justifications. This is the point where the government
would likely introduce evidence of traditional public use justifications. If
the government introduces evidence of legitimate public use, then it has
met its burden.
If the condemnor carries its burden in the second step of the analysis,
the burden shifts back to the condemnee.2 4 2 The burden on the condemnee in this third step of the analysis is to show that the condemnor's
asserted public justifications for the private involvement are pretextual.
Essentially, the condemnee has the burden of showing that the conferring
of a private benefit is more likely than not the true purpose of the proposed taking and that the asserted public justifications are merely
pretextual.
The benefit to the condemnee in reaching this stage of the analysis is
the ability to propound discovery. In order to refute the public benefit
justifications asserted by the government in the second prong of the analysis, a condemnee would most certainly need discovery for adequate
refutation.
This step in the analysis is an inherently heavy burden. The condemnee has the burden of showing that the legislature's asserted public
justifications, which have been historically accorded supreme deference
under the Berman and Midkiff standards, are not the true purpose for the
taking. Essentially, as in Cleburne, evidence must be introduced that the

239.
240.
241.
242.

See Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450 (1985).
Id.
Kelly, supra note 212, at218.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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government's reasoning behind the private involvement enlisted by the
government has no merit. 243
2. A Presumption of Invalidity in Certain Situations
After discussing the concept of impermissible favoritism, Justice Kennedy then recognized a second category of takings in which a presumption
of invalidity may be warranted. 2 4 4 Specifically, Justice Kennedy provided
that "[t]here may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
Clause." 245 Although Justice Kennedy then went on to say that it is "not
the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more
demanding standard," 24 6 it is noteworthy to discuss the concept. As discussed above, the impermissible favoritism analysis is not necessarily a departure from Berman and Midkiff, and the pretextual challenge can
supplement the deferential standard instead of supplanting it-but that is
not true for this concept. As Justice Kennedy comments, this more stringent standard would be a departure from Berman and Midkiff.2 47
Noting that it seems such a burdensome task to make a claim within
the purview of the impermissible favoritism prong of the pretextual challenge, it is hard to imagine circumstances in which the "risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism"248 is more acute. However, there are such instances that may raise such concern. For example, private transfers to
transferees with certain relationships to the officials making eminent domain situations could possibly have the high risk of favoritism mentioned.
These relationships could exist with a variety of individuals or entities: family, close friends, voters, 249 campaign contributors, etc. I would suggest that
courts confronted by takings involving private transfers to transferees on
the above-mentioned list presume invalidity and apply a more stringent
standard in determining whether an impermissible private purpose exists.
D.

Analyzing Goldstein Under the Analysis Set Forth Herein

The first step in the burden-shifting analysis is the prima facie case of
the condemnee. In order to establish a prima facie case of pretextual private involvement, a condemnee must put forward specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations which establish pretext. 250 The question to ask is
whether the plaintiffs made a "plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism." To do so, we must apply the above factors, and determine on a
243. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
244. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See MHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-00-03785 VRW, 2008 WL 440282, at *24
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008).
250. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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totality-of-circumstances basis whether the condemnee has set forth a
"plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism." It is important to note
that the facts on the record were not derived with this analysis in mind, so
its application is purely for demonstrative purposes.
First, the identity of the transferee, Mr. Ratner, was known prior to
the assertion of public justifications; in fact, "[Mr.] Ratner was the impetus
behind the Project, i.e., that he, not a state agency, first conceived of developing Atlantic Yards." 25 1 While this factor is not determinative of a finding
of impermissible favoritism, it does open the door for potential favoritism
to this private entity, Mr. Ratner, if other factors are also met.
Second, we look at the transferee/beneficiary selection process itself.
Here, Mr. Ratner was "the impetus behind the Project," and therefore no
competitive process ensued. This factor, like the first factor, is not determinative, but the fact that the first two factors were met indicates a risk of
impermissible favoritism.
Third, we look to whether efforts were made to transfer the land by
taking officials prior to the public justifications. Here, plaintiffs claim that
"public uses being proffered by [A]ppellees . . . were post hoc justifications." 2 52 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Takings Area, as opposed
to the Renewal Area that was deemed blighted in 1968, was not deemed
blighted until years after the Project was announced. While these may
seem like just the kind of post hoc justifications this third factor is created
to detect, we still must remember the deferential standard from over a century of precedent, and not depart from said standard. Berman informs us
that courts will not use a "piecemeal approach," but will instead redevelop
areas as a whole. 2 53 Further, the redevelopment as a whole meets the public use requirement.2 54 Therefore, the post hoc justifications third factor is
not met here, but remember, not all of these factors need to be satisfied.
Rather, the factors are here to indicate whether there is favoritism.
The fourth factor is also not invoked because there were no allegations
made that there was an absence of an integrated development plan.
The fifth factor is a predictably complex matter in this case. Weighing
the projected benefits conferred to Mr. Ratner against the projected benefits to the public by redressing blight, building an arena, and building housing is quite the task, and is border-line intrusive scrutiny, but the duty here
is to ensure that the proposed pubic justifications are in fact the true purposes of the transfer. Obviously, Mr. Ratner, a businessman, expects to
make a great deal of money off this transaction. There is great value in
building a professional sports arena, not to mention obtaining "some of the
most valuable real estate in Brooklyn" for doing so. 2 5 The Project also
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 56.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56.
Id. at 59.
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includes plans for affordable housing. 25 6 However, plaintiffs allege, and
factual assertions are to be taken as true, that the Project will result in no
below-market housing, but actually will be for the most part luxury housing.257 Plaintiffs contend that this affordable housing paradox indicates the
true intention of Mr. Ratner: making money off the luxury housing rather
than redressing blight in the area. 258
The second part of this balancing test requires weighing the projected
public benefits. It is quite hard to quantify the value of removing blight
and slums, as well as the value of the great number of jobs that the arena
will create in the area. However, the affordable housing of the Project
does indicate an alternative motive. If the housing aspect were to benefit
the public, the housing would need to be affordable to the public, and not
consist of mainly luxury homes.
The balance here is far from one-sided. While Mr. Ratner is projected
to make a great deal of money, and he is able to obtain some of the most
valuable real estate in Brooklyn at a low cost, the public is also benefitting
as a whole. It is a fact that the Renewal Area was deemed blighted and
there is value that the public will receive from redressing this blight and
bringing jobs to the area. It appears to me that Mr. Ratner could potentially receive a greater benefit than the public through this taking. Thus,
the projected private benefits may outweigh the projected public benefits.
Ultimately, it is hard to determine from the facts on the record
whether the condemnee's first burden is met, but the facts do seem to indicate a "plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism" sufficient to carry
the burden. The private transferee was known prior to the taking, there
was no competitive process, and the projected private benefits potentially
outweigh the projected public benefits. Assuming for demonstrative purposes that the condemnee's burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
condemnor, the government.
The condemnor's burden is to demonstrate that the evidence
presented by the plaintiff is insufficient to demonstrate a pretext. This can
be done by providing evidence refuting the allegations made by the condemnee in its prima facie case. For example, if a local government is able
to show that a particular private party's involvement is necessary because
of knowledge, resources, or ability, and that pre-condemnation private involvement is not possible without designating the party as the post-condemnation developer, then the government might be able to satisfy its
burden. 2 59 For the most part, the condemnor's burden is to provide specific
justification for the private involvement and that it is necessary for the promotion of the asserted public justifications. This is the point where the
government likely would introduce evidence of traditional public use
justifications.
256.
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259.
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The condemnor in Goldstein, the ESDC, asserted the following as
public purposes to be served by the Project:
(1) The elimination of blight in both the Takings and Non-Takings
Areas which is the purported "principal" public purpose of the
Project;
(2) An arena to be used by a major-league sports franchise, for athletic contests featuring local academic institutions, and for other
entertainment and civic events;
(3) Approximately 2,250 units of "affordable" rental housing and between 3,075 and 4,180 units of "market rate" housing;
(4) Between 336,000 and 1,606,000 square feet of office space;
(5) "Possibly" a hotel;
(6) Eight acres of publicly accessible space;
(7) Ground-level retail space "to activate the street frontages";
(8) "Community facility spaces," including those offering child care
and "youth and senior center service";
(9) A facility for the Long Island Railroad to store, clean, and inspect its trains;
(10) An additional entrance to an already existing subway station;
(11) "[S]ustainability and green design"; and
(12) "[E]nvironmental remediation of the Project Site." 2 6 0
Clearly, the above-mentioned objectives represent substantial public
justifications sufficient to carry the second burden. If so, the burden then
shifts back to the condemnee.
The condemnee's burden in this third step of the analysis is to show
that the condemnor's asserted public justifications for the private involvement are pretextual. Essentially, the condemnee has the burden of showing that the conferring of a private benefit is more likely than not the true
purpose of the proposed taking and the asserted public justifications are
merely pretextual.
Appellants should be allowed discovery at this stage in order to refute
the condemnor's justifications. Appellants would strive to prove Mr.
Ratner's and the state's true purpose in the taking was to transfer the property to Mr. Ratner for his personal benefit. This may be feasible by proving that the area was falsely deemed blighted, the housing plans were
superficial, or prior attempts were made by Mr. Ratner and the state for
such a transfer. However, this is all conjecture and mere speculation for
the purpose of demonstrating the likely mechanics of this analysis. The
burdens are heavy, and the likelihood of success is low; however, a day in
court is well worth the struggle.
260. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Determinations and
Findings) (citations omitted).

120

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

VI.

[VOL. 30:87

CONCLUSION

The United States Constitution provides that no land shall be taken
pursuant to eminent domain without sufficient public justifications. 2 6 1 It is
the power of the legislature to dictate this authority, but it is the role of the
judiciary, though a narrow one, to ensure that the legislature's authority is
used responsibly. In the event that the legislature does overstep its authority by administering takings with insufficient public justifications, the judiciary must protect land-owners by rejecting those asserted justifications.
Goldstein does not simply set forth another decision debating whether
a legislature's public justifications were sufficient; rather, the Second Circuit was confronted with the question of whether asserted public justifications were the actual purposes of the taking or merely pretextual. In this
case, the Second Circuit dismissively rejected the pretextual challenge and
took the legislature's proposed justifications for face value. However, the
pretextual challenge is not going away, and courts must develop a sufficient
standard. I only hope this Note provides future courts and litigants with
some guidance.

261. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

